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Introduction
A surge in M&A activity since the 1990s has imitated an extensive literature that addresses a number of issues surrounding M&As. For instance, Andrade et al. (2001) show that shares is a preferred method of payment while Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that acquirers use their overvalued equity in order to acquire targets and their respective assets at a discount. Emery and Switzer (1999) suggest that acquirers exploit information asymmetries for selecting the deal payment method with expectations of higher abnormal returns. Therefore, the choice of payment method of M&As can significantly influence the shareholders' wealth at the time of the M&A announcement and during the post-merger period.
1 Evidence in the literature supports the asymmetric information hypothesis that acquirers with cash offers experience higher abnormal returns than acquirers with share offers. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) report that both bidder and target firms have higher returns with cash payments compared to equity payments. Similarly, Houston and Ryngaert (1997) find that acquirers outperform when a greater proportion of cash is used for acquiring target firms. Moeller et al. (2007) find a negative relationship between information asymmetry and the stock performance of acquirers of public firms. Andrade et al. (2001) show that acquirers using shares in the M&A payment, have a negative stock performance over the three days surrounding the M&A announcement, while acquirers with pure equity financing have a small positive performance. Moreover, acquirers that use stock as payment for M&As significantly underperform over a five year period compared to acquirers that use cash as the payment method (Loughran and Vijh, 1997) . However, using equity as payment for M&As benefits acquirers during the announcement period when targets are difficult to value -especially 3 private targets (Officer et al., 2009 ). Therefore, a stock payment can mitigate the potential risk of a target firm being overvalued.
While cross-border M&As can be an important entry mode for foreign markets they are related to higher levels of risk and uncertainty for both acquirers and targets. The wealth effects of cross-border M&As are lower compared to domestic M&As (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) . Cakici et al. (1996) find that while US acquirers do not gain from cross-border M&As, foreign firms acquiring US targets have a significant and positive market performance, in line with Akihigbe and Martin (2000) . Moreover, Black et al. (2007) report that US acquirers engaging in cross-border M&As experience significantly negative long-run post-merger abnormal returns. However, Francoeur (2006) finds that Canadian firms acquiring foreign targets create great efficiency gains and increase their shareholder value while there are no sustained gains or losses for domestic M&As. In the UK, Conn et al. (2005) report negative announcement and post-announcement returns for domestic and public M&A targets, zero announcement returns and negative post-merger returns for cross-border public deals, and positive announcement returns for private targets. Meanwhile, foreign acquirers with UK targets have negative announcement returns (Danbolt, 1995) , and UK firms acquiring domestic targets outperform their counterparts that acquire US and European targets (Aw and Chatterjee, 2004 ).
In the UK, which is the focal point of this study, the majority (approximately 80%) of target firms are privately held companies (Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2008) . Chang (1998) argues that takeovers of private targets via share payment tend to create large block shareholders as the ownership of private targets is highly concentrated. It is widely documented that large shareholders and institutional investors in particular can significantly influence firms' decision making and especially on M&As (Stulz et al., 1990; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira et al., 2010; Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015) . 4 Moreover, institutional investors can be active investors and discourage poor decisions made by entrenched managers (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Duggal and Millar, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . The shareholdings of institutional investors in the US and the UK has increased significantly since the 1990s (Aguilera et al., 2006) with approximately 50% of the UK equity markets being held by institutional investors (Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015) . Nevertheless, UK managers are more restricted compared to their US counterparts due to the greater influence and monitoring of institutional investors (Short and Keasey, 1999) .
In support of the monitoring argument, the positive relationship between acquirer firms' stock returns with share payments and the new block shareholders from the target company
suggests that large shareholders are effective monitors (Chang, 1998) . Duggal and Millar (1999) report a positive relationship between institutional ownership and acquirers' abnormal returns in the US but argue this positive relationship is driven by firm size and the acquirers'
listing on the S&P 500 index, casting doubt on the active monitoring role in the M&As'
transactions. However, Kohers and Kohers (2001) show that acquirers with higher institutional ownership have superior post-merger long-run performance. Meanwhile, institutional investors have a significantly lower share turnover rate in the UK compared to the US (Black and Coffee, 1994; Aguilera et al., 2006) suggesting they can have a key role in the monitoring of firms and firms' decision making.
We assess the monitoring role of institutional ownership on acquirers' performance reflected by the market reaction during the announcement period of M&As and the short-term post-announcement period. Moreover, we delve deeper into the impact of institutional ownership by splitting institutional ownership between domestic and foreign investors. We find that total, foreign, and domestic institutional ownership has a negative impact on the market reaction during the M&A announcement. However, during the short-term post-announcement period acquirers with greater total and domestic institutional investors outperform their peers.
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In addition, the results show that acquirer firms with higher ownership concentration by long-term institutional investors have a smaller market reaction during the M&A announcement but outperform their peers over the 20 days following the announcement, consistent with Gaspar et al. (2005) . Overall, our results suggest that a greater presence of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon reduces information asymmetries and equity mispricing during the announcement, as evident by a small price reaction.
Meanwhile the positive post-announcement performance is due to institutional and long-term institutional investors being effective monitors, therefore decreasing the likelihood of an M&A being a poor decision and resulting in a positive market performance. Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Del Guercio (1996) suggest that institutional investors are more likely to shift their investment toward 'good' or 'glamour' equity rather than basing their investment decisions on objective risk characteristics, especially for banks and mutual funds.
Moreover, Carline et al. (2009) report a poor performance for acquirers that target domestic firms and have lower growth opportunities. Glamour acquirers are firms with a high market valuation measured by the price-to-earnings ratio or the market-to-book value ratio (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) and are considered to have higher future growth opportunities and experience higher announcement returns (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes, 1991; Megginson et al., 2004) . Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that glamour acquirers experience significantly higher announcement returns than value acquirers but with a reversal in performance over a three year period following the announcement. Kohers and Kohers (2001) find that the poor post-announcement performance of glamour acquirers is driven by the adverse effects of acquirers' agency problems. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that UK glamour acquirers experience negative long-run returns following M&A announcements.
However, Conn et al. (2005) We assess whether institutional ownership has a varying impact between value and glamour acquirers and their respective market performance during the short-term announcement and post-announcement periods. We find that value acquirers consistently outperform glamour acquirers during the announcement and post-announcement periods. Our findings are consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) . However, our results show that glamour acquirers with a higher concentration of domestic institutional investors have a better post-announcement performance.
In summary, our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we assess the impact of institutional ownership on the market reaction to M&A announcements while providing a further breakdown of institutional investors between domestic and foreign investors. Second, we assess the short-term market performance of value, moderate, and glamour firms, surrounding M&A announcements and evaluate the marginal influence of domestic institutional ownership on glamour firms. Third, we ensure our findings are robust by controlling for an extensive number of deal-specific and firm-specific characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and sets the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4 we provide and discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review and Hypotheses
Glamour acquirers
Firms that are perceived to have high growth opportunities typically have high price valuations reflecting their past earnings and cash flow performance, and the expectation of 7 sustainable future growth. The positive expectation of future growth allows glamour acquirers to make value-decreasing acquisitions for which the market may not penalise them (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) . This is in line with the hypothesis that managerial hubris plays an important role in the decision making process of glamour acquirer firms when managers may be overconfident about their ability to manage an M&A deal (Roll, 1986) .
Furthermore, firms with high market-to-book ratios are subject to higher information asymmetries because a large proportion of their market value comes from intangible assets (Moeller et al., 2004) . Therefore, these firms are more likely to be overvalued (Dong et al., 2006) . Due to information asymmetries, managers of glamour firms may know that their shares are trading at unsustainable levels and will try to convert shares into real assets. This is one of the reasons why glamour acquirers prefer to make share payments for acquiring firms (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) . Moreover, firm takeovers can be used to attract investors' scrutiny, potentially leading to the revaluation of undervalued firms (Draper and Paudyal, 2008) .
Glamour firms' typically high growth in cash flows and earnings can reassure managers about their ability to handle an M&A and potentially enhance managers' overconfidence. In contrast, value acquirers are more prudent when making takeover decisions and therefore are more likely to create value for shareholders (Lakonishok et al., 1992) . Pástor and Veronesi (2003) find evidence that firms' market-to-book value increases with the uncertainty about average profitability as well as the idiosyncratic return volatility, especially for firms that do not pay dividends.
According to the performance extrapolation hypothesis, investors reward or penalise firms based on the belief that past performance will persist into the future. Therefore, investors over-extrapolate past positive performance of glamour firms considering that it can be sustained in the future. Similarly, investors penalise value stocks based on the idea that 8 poor recent performance will persist. Lang et al. (1989) , Servaes (1991) , and Megginson et al. (2004) find that glamour acquirers earn significantly higher announcement period returns than value acquirers. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that glamour acquirers underperform over the three years following an M&A, which the authors attribute to the market's higher expectations due to the over-extrapolation of the glamour firms' past performance. However, these findings contradict those of Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003 
Institutional Ownership
Institutional investors can act as effective monitors of managers' behavior and strategy, and therefore can influence both current and future firm performance (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003 Verrechia (1991) and Kim and Verrechia (1994) suggest that increased institutional ownership is positively associated with expanded disclosure which can reduce information asymmetries and increase firms' stock liquidity. Lev (1992) argues that institutional investors are preferred by the firms in which they invested, due to their better monitoring performance and the requirement of sophisticated and future-oriented information.
Regarding M&As, Eakins (1993) finds that institutional investors are important players in
M&As that involve changes in corporate control. Moreover, institutional investors may act to alleviate agency problems and discourage poor management decisions from entrenched managers and therefore, higher institutional ownership is positively associated with tender offers (Kohers et al., 2007) . This is in line with Gaspar et al. (2005) who argue that institutional investors can be effective monitors and mitigate the agency costs that arise during
M&As between shareholders and managers. Stulz et al. (1990) show that higher institutional ownership has a positive relationship with lower takeover premiums. Duggal and Millar (1999) 10 show that institutional ownership has a positive impact on acquirers' returns but find that this positive relationship is primarily driven by firm size. Chen et al. (2007) find that firms with independent long-term oriented institutional investors outperform those with moderate (grey) or short-term oriented investors over the three years following an M&A announcement.
Similarly, Gaspar et al. (2005) find that acquirers with more short-term institutional investors experience lower announcement returns which the authors attribute to the weaker monitoring that can allow managers to make acquisitions that can damage the value of the firm.
Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) we test for possible effects of concentrated institutional ownership and use the sum of holdings of the five largest (top 5) institutional investors 2 . We also use the holdings of the largest institutional investor.
Therefore we assess the impact of institutional ownership on the market valuation during the short-term window surrounding the M&A announcement. We state our hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Greater institutional ownership has a positive impact on acquirers'
short-term post-announcement performance.
Hypothesis 4: Long-term institutional investors have a positive impact on acquirers'
Payment Method
If all investors enjoy the same information (in a perfect market) the method of payment for an M&A should have no impact on the wealth creation. In reality, both acquirer and target firms have different preferences for the deal payment methods due to the existence of asymmetric information. For instance, firms are less likely to acquire firms that are foreign and privately owned via a share payment (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) . Reuer et al. (2004) argue that the method of payment used in M&As can significantly influence the valuation of the participating firms, consequently affecting the wealth of the participating shareholders.
Cash or debt financing is preferred, compared to stock financing, as the latter dilutes the existing shareholdings and increases the risk of losing control (Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks et al. 1988; Amihud et al., 1990) . Chang (1998) suggests that financing an M&A with common stock is similar to a private placement of equity because the target is owned by one or a small number of shareholders. In the UK, a large proportion of M&A target firms are privately held. Therefore, the consideration of avoiding block shareholders and keeping voting power is an important factor for using cash offers. When the target firm is acquired with cash, the target firm's shareholders face immediate tax charges as opposed to a stock payment where tax charges can be deferred (Fuller et al., 2002) . Therefore, the accompanying tax charges lead to a higher premium for cash offers than stock offers to compensate target shareholders for the immediate payment of taxes, resulting in higher abnormal returns.
According to Fishman (1989) the key difference between cash and stock financing is that a stock's value depends on the profitability of M&A deals, while the value of cash does not.
Therefore, the target firms need to make an efficient decision rejecting or accepting the offer as targets and acquirers have asymmetric information. Typically, a cash payment benefits acquirers since the market views cash payments as a positive signal of expectations for future returns (Conn et al., 2005) . There are two main explanations for this. First, acquirers prefer a share payment when their stock is overvalued as they try to exploit their information advantages by offering stock financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) .
Since acquirers face the risk of incorrectly valuing a target, due to information asymmetries, they may prefer a share payment offer because in that case the target firm's shareholders share part of the valuation risk of the merged entity (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) . However, target firms will expect a cash payment when the acquirers' equity is undervalued, leading to 12 payment methods acting as informational signals (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Chemmanur et al. Irrespective of acquirers' pre-bid financial status, in the UK a cash payment can generate higher post-acquisition shareholder returns for acquiring firms over a 3-year period compared to share payment (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Abhyankar et al., 2005) . As earlier discussed, the information asymmetries between the shareholders of acquiring and target firms are at the core of the financing decision. However, institutional investors can be effective monitors, mitigate information asymmetries and influence both the current and future performance of a firm (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gaspar et al., 2005) . Therefore, we test whether the institutional investors affect the signaling and respective market reaction to the choice of payment method, cash 3 or shares, surrounding the M&A announcement. We set our hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Acquirers making cash payments experience a higher market reaction to the M&A announcement. Table 1. 14 3.2. Descriptive statistics the total deal value of cross-border transactions accounts for over 79% of the total deal value of all M&As undertaken by UK listed companies during our sample period.
[Insert Table 2 about here] overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) . Moreover, the figures show that glamour acquirers are more engaged (172 M&As) in the high-tech industry as opposed to value acquirers (82 M&As).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Moreover, we find that value acquirers have a greater presence of institutional investors than moderate and glamour acquirers, with the top 5 institutional ownerships being 26.95%, 25.34% and 24.10% for value, moderate and glamour acquirers, respectively. However, there is no significant difference in the total institutional ownership across the three types of acquirers.
When analyzing further the type of institutional investors, i.e. between domestic and foreign investors, we find some discrepancies. In particular, we find that foreign institutional investors prefer glamour acquirers whereas domestic institutional investors are more prominent in value acquirers. Moreover, we find that value acquirers attract more long-term institutional investors (40.68%), as opposed to moderate (40.55%) and glamour (38.29%) acquirers. Similarly, short-term investors have a higher presence in glamour acquirers as opposed to value acquirers.
Finally, we find that glamour acquirers are smaller in size, have lower leverage and higher cash ratios 7 consistent with the existing literature, which suggests that glamour firms usually have higher valuations by the market based on their high growth in cash flow and earnings (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) .
Empirical results
Short-term value creation for the acquirers
We employ a standard event study of methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal experience an economically significant market reaction on the day of the announcement which persists over the 20-day post-announcement period. This is contrary to the market reaction to glamour acquirers where there is an insignificant market reaction followed by a negative performance approximately a week following the M&A announcement.
We assess the market reaction to M&A announcements in more detail in Table 4 . Overall, we do not find strong evidence of a pre-event out(under)performance but we find strong evidence of a positive market reaction across all event windows (-1, +1), (Day 0), and (-5, +5).
Overall, we find that acquirers enjoy an average 0.598% outperformance during the 3-day event window, with domestic M&As having significantly better outperformance (0.763%) compared to cross-border deals (0.363%), also consistent with Conn et al. (2005) . Similarly, we find that value acquirers enjoy a significantly higher market reaction (0.747%) compared to glamour acquirers (0.219%). This is consistent with the notion that the UK market over-extrapolates acquirers' past performance prior to M&A announcements (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) , since in the UK most targets are privately held firms and tend to accept the equity of value bidders as it is less likely to be overpriced (Chang, 1998) .
[Insert Table 4 about here]
During the post-announcement period (+2, 20) there is a reversal in performance which dissipates almost all gains from the announcement market reaction. This reversal applies to both domestic and cross-border M&As. However, we find that value acquirers retain any gains from the market reaction to the announcement, contrary to glamour acquirers which display a negative performance of approximately 1% over the 20-day period following the announcement.
We analyze further the performance of domestic and cross-border M&As across the three MTBV groups of acquirers: value, moderate and glamour. The results in Table 5 show that overall there is no significant difference between domestic and cross-border M&As for each acquirer category, with the exception of the moderate acquirers where the market reaction on day 0 for domestic deals is approximately threefold compared to cross-border deals. Moreover, we find that value and moderate acquirers outperform glamour acquirers during the announcement event windows, consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) who find that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers, but contrary to the 'over-extrapolation'
hypothesis (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998 ) that suggests markets favor glamour acquirers during M&A announcements. Finally, the results confirm the earlier graphical illustration pointing to an underperformance for glamour acquirers, mostly driven by cross-border M&As, following the deal announcement, as opposed to value and moderate acquirers which retain the gains achieved during the deal announcement.
[Insert targets, whereas we assess the market reaction on the acquirers only. For instance, the authors report a (-1,+1) CAR of -0.78% and 11.81% for acquirers and targets respectively, which shows that on average acquirers have a negative market reaction and therefore the relationship between foreign investors and the market valuation may be driven by the targets' market 19 valuation. Moreover, a higher proportion of UK institutional investors have a lower turnover rate leading to a lower market reaction for domestic deals (0.376% for the 6-day window) similar to the performance of firms with higher total institutional ownership (0.357% for the 6-day window).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The evidence from the firm-specific characteristics shows that smaller firms experience a higher market reaction when undertaking a cross-border M&A, due to the higher information asymmetries. This supports the conclusion of firm size effect in acquisition announcement returns by Moeller et al. (2004) who report an approximately 2% higher announcement return for smaller acquirer shareholders irrespective of the financing resources and listing status.
Moreover, value firms outperform glamour firms during the event and post-event windows for domestic deals and for the post-event window only for cross-border deals. [Insert Table 7 about here]
Multivariate Analysis
In this section we assess the combined drivers of the market valuation to M&A announcements. We do so with a standard ordinary least squares regression as shown below:
( 1) is the CARs for the event window (-1, +1) 8 and the post-event window (+2, +20) for acquirer i for M&A deal j at time t. Cross-border is a binary variable equal to one when the target is a non-UK firm, and zero otherwise for M&A j. Cross-industry is a binary variable equal to one when acquirer and target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise for M&A j. Deal size is the natural logarithm of the deal value for M&A j. Institutional ownership, Deal characteristics and Firm characteristics are matrices of institutional owners and turnover, M&A deal-specific information and firm-specific characteristics respectively, as described earlier in Table 1 . Finally, we control for industry and time fixed effects.
The results on the event window reported in Table 8 show that it is mostly value acquirers that are affected by institutional ownership. In particular, consistent with our previous results, we find that acquirers with a higher concentration of long-term institutional investors experience a lower market reaction on the day of the M&A announcement. The same impact is found for domestic and total institutional ownership, suggesting that the presence of 8 The results for the extended event window (-5, +5) remain unaltered and are not reported for brevity.
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institutional investors minimizes an overreaction to material news such as M&As. Moreover, we find that smaller value firms experience a higher market reaction which can be attributed to the relatively higher information asymmetries among value firms. Surprisingly though, we find no evidence of foreign institutional investors affecting the market reaction or of any other deal or firm characteristic having a significant influence. The exception is the negative impact of foreign institutional investors on moderate acquirers. We find no evidence of institutional investors, deals, or firm characteristics affecting the market reaction to the M&A announcement for glamour acquirers.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The results of the post-announcement valuation drivers show that the financial crisis has a negative impact, as expected, for value acquirers. Moreover, we find that more profitable, and with lower cash levels, value acquirers have a better post-announcement performance. The results of the moderate acquirers show that only the financial crisis has a negative post-announcement impact. The evidence on glamour acquirers shows that glamour firms that make cash payments have a better post-event performance, as opposed to share payments. This is consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Abhyankar et al. (2005) , and suggests that the market prefers glamour acquirers to pay cash so that the existing shareholders will not lose their voting power nor their growth potential and respective stock appreciation of the glamour firm. Finally, the presence of domestic and total institutional investors has a positive impact on the post-event market reaction, due to their monitoring role which can prevent managers from making poor investment decisions (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gaspar et al., 2005) .
[Insert Table 9 about here]
For further analysis we pool our samples and re-run our regressions while controlling for acquirers' market-to-book. As an alternative to the market-to-book ratio we include a 22 categorical variable Glamour category that takes the value of 1 for value acquirers (first tercile of market-to-book ratio), 2 for moderate MTBV acquirers (second tercile of market-to-book ratio) and 3 for glamour acquirers (third tercile of market-to-book ratio).The results are reported in Table 10 (1992) and Del Guercio (1996) suggest that institutional investors are more likely to shift their investment towards the 'good' or 'glamour' equity, rather than basing their investment decisions on objective risk characteristics, especially for banks and mutual funds. This also supports the argument that institutional investors can shape corporate risk-taking activities and monitor firm strategies and corporate decision making (Wright et al., 1996) , thereby helping to reduce firms' risk levels through effectively monitoring management and enhancing corporate decision-making quality (Roberts and Yuan, 2010) . Overall, these findings are contrary to our hypothesis H4 at least for 23 the market reaction to the M&A announcement.
The results further show that glamour acquirers, captured by the MTBV ratio or the glamour category, have a lower market reaction to the M&A announcement supporting our hypothesis H1 and consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) . Moreover, we find that larger acquirers experience a lower market reaction due to the lower information asymmetries.
However, we find no evidence of deal size having a significant impact when controlling for other firm-, deal-and ownership-specific factors, contrary to Loderer and Martin ( [Insert Table 10 about here]
When it comes to the post-announcement window (+2, +20) the results of the payment method show that cash payments are preferred by the market compared to share payments, consistent with our hypothesis H5. Compared to our findings on the market reaction to the event window, we find a reversal on the impact of institutional investors. In particular, domestic and long-term oriented institutional investors have a positive impact on the post-event market reaction. Similarly, a higher ownership by total institutional investors has a positive impact. These findings support our hypotheses H3 and H4 for the short-term post-announcement performance, suggesting that institutional investors are effective monitors by focusing on the managers' behavior and firms' developing strategy. Moreover, the results of the performance between value and glamour acquirers hold for the post-announcement market valuation, suggesting that glamour acquirers experience lower returns and this is consistent with our hypothesis H1. We further analyze the marginal impact of glamour acquirers with a higher institutional ownership, by interacting the market-to-book ratio with domestic 24 institutional ownership. Although we find that glamour firms underperform, glamour acquirers with a higher domestic institutional ownership have a significantly better post-announcement performance, which supports our hypothesis H2. Finally, we find that acquirers with higher leverage have a poor post-announcement performance while other firmor deal-specific characteristics are not significant factors.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the market reaction during the short-term period surrounding the announcement of M&As in the UK and evaluate the impact of institutional ownership on value and glamour acquirers. We find that value acquirers consistently outperform glamour acquirers during M&A announcements and over the short-term post-announcement period, in line with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) , while contrasting the outperformance of glamour acquirers reported in Rau and Vermaelen (1998) . Finally, we find that cross-border deals result in a lower market reaction only during the M&A announcement, due to the transaction costs and information asymmetries associated with cross-border M&As.
Our findings should be treated with a caveat regarding the relationship between institutional ownership, firm size, and respective information asymmetries. For instance,
Ferreira and Matos (2008) suggest that institutional investors prefer large firms, whereas
Hussain (2000) reports that UK institutional investors prefer smaller and widely held firms.
The purpose of this paper is not to document and test the investment preferences of different types of institutional investors, but rather to assess the information asymmetries and respective market valuations, as well as the extent to which they are driven by varying types of institutional investors that are already present in a firm, for significant events such as
M&As. The establishment of the causality and directional effects between different types of institutional investor, firm size, and market performance would be a fertile ground for further investigation. Cumulative percentage shareholdings held by all institutional investors in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior deal announcement (Thomson Reuters). Low-turnover Institutional Ownership Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate less than or equal to 50% at the year-end prior deal announcement and zero otherwise (Thomson Reuters).
Moderate-turnover Institutional Ownership
Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate greater than 50% and less than or equal to 100% at the year-end prior the deal announcement and zero otherwise (Thomson Reuters). High-turnover Institutional Ownership Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate greater than 100% at the year-end prior the deal announcement and zero otherwise (Thomson Reuters).
Panel B Firm-specific control variables
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope). ROA Return on assets of acquirer firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope). Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).
Cash & Equivalent
Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).
Dividend Yield
Ratio of common cash dividends relative to the share price at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).
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Share Turnover Number of shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope). Market-to-book ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).
Glamour category
Categorical variable that takes the value of 1 for value acquirers (first tercile of market-to-book ratio), 2 for moderate MTBV acquirers (second tercile of market-to-book ratio) and 3 for glamour acquirers (third tercile of market-to-book ratio). This figure presents the daily cumulative average abnormal returns around the M&A announcement date for value and glamour acquirers, from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010, using a standard event study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated based on the one-factor OLS market model with the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. Acquirers are ranked into three equally-weighted terciles based on their MTBV: 797 value (low MTBV), 797 moderate, and 798 glamour (high MTBV). This table presents average CARs around M&As announcements and computed using an event study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated as the market adjusted returns with the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample contains 2,582 M&A, including 1,519 domestic deals and 1,063 cross-border deals from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. The market-to-book value (MTBV) is the ratio of the market capitalization of acquirer firm's equity to the book value of equity at the year-end prior to the announcement date. Acquirers are ranked into three equally-weighted terciles based on their MTBV: 797 value (low MTBV), 797 moderate, and 798 glamour (high MTBV). 
